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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Pina timely appeals from the Judgment of Conviction entered against him, in which
he was adjudged guilty of First Degree Murder, and the district court imposed and executed a
unified sentence of life, with thirty years fixed.
In an issue of first impression for Idaho appellate courts, Mr. Pina asserts that Idaho's
felony murder statute adopted the common-law definition of felony murder, including the
requirement that the parties involved must be acting in concert with one another. Because the
district court applied a broader proximate cause analysis, the court incorrectly denied both
Mr. Pina's motions for a judgment of acquittal and for jury instructions on the agency theory of
felony murder liability.
Finally, in another issue of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Pina asserts that the district
court erred when, without any inquiry into the merit of the reason for discharge, the quality of
counsel's representation prior to the request, whether any disruptive effect would result from the
discharge, the rationale for the timing of the request, the complexity and stage of the
proceedings, and any prior requests by the defendant to discharge counsel, it denied Mr. Pina's
mid-trial motion to proceed pro se. Mr. Pina asserts that in the absence of a proper inquiry, the
district court abused its discretion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
By all accounts, Jesse Naranjo and seventeen-year-old Johnny Allen Shores did not get
along. (Tr., p.1159, Ls.11-25, p.1258, Ls.1-5, p.1267, L.13.) In 2004, Jesse had a habit of
pestering Johnny to front him drugs without payment, and; on at least one occasion, became

angry when Johnny didn't cooperate. (Tr., p.1360, Ls.3-8, p.1361, Ls.5-22.) Jesse persisted, "I
never done you wrong, man. Quit being a fucking punk." (Tr., p.1361, Ls.5-24.) On that
occasion, Johnny's father had to intervene and make Jesse leave. (Tr., p.1361, Ls.5-13.) In
general, Johnny felt like he was being picked on and that Jesse was trying to intimidate him with
his size. (Tr., p.1360, L.16 - p.1361, L.1.) In late 2005, Jesse and Johnny became embroiled in
a "big argument." (Tr., p.1359, Ls.4-5.) Although the reasons for the argument are unclear,
Jesse did owe Johnny money for drugs. (Tr., p. 1359, Ls. 1-15.)
On November 29, 2005, Johnny shot Jesse Naranjo to death with a sawed-off shotgun.
(See generally Tr.) According to those present, the problem began when Jesse pulled his car in

front of Jay Martindale's house. (Tr., p.1159, Ls.1-2.) Jake DeGarmo, who was out front, told
Jesse to leave, warning that "something's going to happen." (Tr., p.1160, Ls.6-7.) Instead, Jesse
told DeGarmo to "Get Carlos." (Tr., p.1160, Ls.6-9.)
Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina, also known as Carlos, was inside of Martindale's house.
(Tr., p.1046, Ls.2-6.) When Martindale told Carlos that Jesse was out front, Carlos generally
responded with, "Not here." (Tr., p. 1046, Ls.5-13.) Carlos had someone tell Jesse to pull his car
around to the back of the house. (Tr., p. 1160, Ls. 19-24.) After Jesse pulled around back, Carlos,
with his hands in his pockets, came out to Jesse's car. An argument ensued between Carlos and
Jesse, with each yelling at the other. (Tr., p.954, Ls.6-25.) Carlos reached into Jesse's car and
attempted to open the door. When Jesse got out, Carlos put his hands back in his pockets and
followed Jesse into the house, with Jesse repeatedly looking back at Carlos. One witness
speculated that Carlos had a gun in his hand inside the pocket. (Tr., p.956, L.1

- p.957, L.18.)

Once inside the house, Jesse and Carlos continued to argue, both speaking in Spanish.

(Tr., p.1164, L.25 - p.1165, L.4.) With his hand in his pocket, Carlos motioned to the floor and
Jesse got on his knees. (Tr., p.1206, L.24 - p.11.)
Meanwhile, in a nearby bedroom, Johnny and his girlfriend Christina Pierre were
attempting to sleep, but were woken by the argument between Carlos and Jesse. (Tr., p.1214,
L.22 - p.1215, L.7.) Although Johnny recognized Carlos' voice, he "had no clue" Jesse was
there. (Tr., p.1277, Ls.23-24, p.1363, L.7.) Pierre told Johnny to get out of bed and see what
was going on. He suggested they just go back to bed. (Tr., p.1276, Ls.10-20.) However, when
the voices hecane louder, Pierre implored, "Go see what's going on." (Tr., p.1277, Ls.11-13.)
The two got out of bed and opened the bedroom door. Outside, Jesse was already on his knees.
(Tr., p.1216, Ls.1-3; 1277, L.14 - p.1278, L.6.) Pierre also saw that Carlos had a shotgun in his
bands, which he was waving around as he made hand gestures. (Tr., p.1216, Ls.20-24, p.1218,
Ls. 17-24.)
Pierre told Johnny to "make them stop or something and - or take care of this."
(Tr., p.1282, Ls.17-20.) Johnny walked out, around Jesse, and approached Carlos. As the two
spoke, Carlos motioned at Jesse and then at Johnny's feet. Jesse bent down and kissed Johnny's
foot. (Tr., p.1282, L.21 - p.1283, L.25.) Johnny "Nudged him and told him to get up."
(Tr., p.1284, L.2.) He also told Carlos to give him the gun. "No. Fuck this fool," responded
Carlos. "Come on, Carlos, Give me the gun." Johnny repeated. Carlos relented, and gave the
gun to Johnny. (Tr., p.1284, L.13 - p.1285, L.21.)
After Carlos had given the gun to Johnny, Jesse jumped off of his knees, tackled Johnny,
and took the gun. Johnny believed that if he tried to rn he would be shot. Carlos, Johnny and
Jesse all began wrestling over the gun. (Tr., p.1166, Ls.2-7, p.1221, Ls.8-16, p.1286, Ls.17-25.)
As the three fought over the gun, Pierre came through the doorway and the gun was pointed at

her. (Tr., p.1166, Ls.16-19.) At some point, Johnny heard Jesse yelling, "I'll pull the fucking
trigger." (Tr., p.1166, Ls. 13-15; p.1365, Ls.19-21.)
Ultimately, Johnny wrestled control of the gun away from the other two. Jesse and Carlos
continued to fight, with Carlos hitting Jesse in the head. Both others in the house and Johnny
yelled to Carlos and Jesse to, "Knock it off." (Tr., p.1287, L.l - p.1288, L.14.) Jesse ran to the
back of the house, as did Carlos. Jesse tried to get through the back door, but Carlos slammed
the door on him. Johnny followed about four to five feet behind Carlos and Jesse. (Tr., p.1288,
L.12- p.1289, Ls.1-5.)
Johnny was "scared and panicked and didn't know what to do, and I just fired the gun."
(Tr., p.1289, Ls.5-7.) "Carlos was in the way right there, right in front of him, and then I just
fired the gun." (Tr., p.1374, Ls.16-18.) Johnny knew, "When 1 fired the gun, 1 almost hit
Carlos." (Tr., p.1290, Ls.1.) Johnny later said, "I'd probably consider that the warning shot.
Just, I wasn't aiming to hit anybody. I just shot." Johnny wasn't even sure he intended to fire
the gun, "I don't even know. I don't think - it's just like a reaction. I don't know. I was just
scared. It just happened ....I wasn't aiming. I was just

- well,

no. I don't know. I can't really

say. It just - it just happened too fast.. .Didn't think about anything really." (Tr., p.1377, L.22 p.1378, L.9.)
Jesse was shot on the left side of his abdomen, and bled to death. (Tr., p.485, Ls.5-6; p.

504, Ls.9-1 I .)
Carlos Pina was indicted on the charge of "felony murder." (R., p.18.) The indictment
alleged that he was liable for Jesse's death because he:
did wilfully, unlawfidly, and deliberately kidnap Jesse Naranjo by seizing and/or
confining Jesse Naranjo with intent to cause him without authority of law to be
kept andlor detained against his will and that during the course of that kidnapping,
Jesse Naranjo, a human being, was unlawfully killed, to-wit: Jesse Naranjo was

shot in the abdomen with a shotgun, from which he died, in violation of Idaho
Code Section 18-4001, 18-4003(d).
(R., p.18.)
Upon the completion of the presentation of the State's case-in-chief, counsel for Mr. Pina
moved, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, for "a dismissal of this case." (Tr., p.1390, Ls.1619.) Counsel asserted that the State had failed to present a pvirnafacie case of felony murder
because:
the felony murder rule is circumscribed by the limitation that the lethal act must
be in furtherance of a cominon design or an unlawful act that the parties set out to
jointly accomplish....the state has presented no evidence indicating that the death
of Jesse Naranjo was a result of any type of common plan or design that was
embarked upon by my client and Mr. Shores. And the fact that the state has
presented no evidence in support of this would be an appropriate basis and.. .a
mandatory basis for a dismissal of the charge.
Various cases indicate that when an individual is involved in a homicide
and that there is liability to be determined, the individual who is not the person
who commits the killing can only be liable if the person who actually commits the
killing, who actually commits the homicide, is his agent. There has been no such
common design, no such agency shown.

The State objected to the motion. (Tr., p.1394, L.14 - p.1396, L.7.) Counsel for the
State acknowledged, "We don't assert that Mr. Shores was in on the plan, whatever there was, to
kidnap, for whatever purposes, Mr. Naranjo at the time that Mr. Pina brought him into the
house." (Tr., p.1396, Ls.22-25.) Instead, the State asserted, "once Mr. Shores was activated, he
was clearly not on the side of Jesse Naranjo. He was acting with Mr. Pina against Mr. Naranjo."
(Tr., p.1395, L.25

- p.1396,

L.2.) In further argument on the issue, counsel for the State argued

that "there was some form of co-acting on the part of these two people." (Tr., p.1400, Ls.5-6.)
In response, trial counsel noted that "Idaho hasn't had an opportunity to consider this
issue ....We believe the agency theory is [the] majority rule in the United States." (Tr., p.144,

Ls.17-25.) Counsel further asserted, "the action, the lethal act, must have been in furtherance of
a common design or unlawful act that the parties set out to accomplish and this is a joint action."
(Tr., p.1401, Ls.3-6.)
The district court denied the I.C.R. 29 motion. (Tr., p.1403, Ls.5-10.) In doing so, the
district court recognized that there were two distinct legal theories on felony murder "the agency
and proximate cause theories" and that the Idaho appellate courts had not yet adopted either
theory. (Tr., p.1403, Ls.10-15.) The court determined that "it really comes down to an issue of
statutory construction which is a legal question ...." (Tr., p.1404, Ls.4-6.) The district court
found that "any killing committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a kidnapping is
murder in the first degree. Now the question for the jury is whether this killing did in fact occur
during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the kidnapping." (Tr., p.1404, Ls.20-25.)
Further, the district court adopted a "stream-of-events" theory of felony murder, finding that:

I believe the Idaho Code is very clear in that regard, and if the killing occurs, it
does not, our statute does not require a killing to be by the person who initiated
the kidnapping and indeed is silent as to that effect. I believe that silence leaves
for this court to view this matter, not narrowly under the agency theory, but rather
the decision for the jury whether the stream of events is such that this defendant
should be held liable for the felony murder of Mr. Naranjo.
(Tr., p.1405, Ls.1-9.)
During the defense's case-in-chief, trial counsel renewed the I.C.R. 29 motion.
(Tr., p.1531, Ls.23-25.) In support of this motion, counsel noted that the Idaho cases which had
"refer[ed] to the in-the-stream-of-events, all have no doubt that the parties were acting in
concert." (Tr., p.1532, Ls.21-25.)
Without conceding that the defense was correct in its assertion that an unlawfU1 act that
the parties set out to jointly accomplish was necessary, counsel for the State argued that such was
shown by the facts of the case. (See Tr., p.1534, Ls.9-18.) Specifically, the state asserted:

I think that the court can find evidence that's been presented that shows that at
some point they were acting together. They were hoth fighting this same man. It
was two people fighting one person. They were hoth struggling for the same gun,
the gun which Mr. Pina brought to the fight and the gun which Mr. Shores ended
up shooting the person that both of them were struggling against. You know, I
think that that evidence alone shows some acting in concert, at least acting, acting
at the same time for a common goal, that is, fighting Mr. Naranjo.. ..Whether they
had sat down in advance and planned that this is what they were going to do is not
relevant. The question of whether they were both acting illegally and both acting
for a common purpose I think can be answered in the affirmative based on what
the evidence presented.

In addition to re-raising the I.C.R. 29 motion, the defense offered the district court
proposed jury instructions on the issue. (Tr., p.1536, Ls.7-20.) These instructions stated, "In
order to find that a felony murder was committed by the party not committing the lethal act, you
must first find that the party committing the lethal act was the agent of the charged person and
acting in that capacity" and "In order to find that a felony murder was committed by the person
not administering the lethal act, you must first find that the person who committed the lethal act
and the charged person were acting in concert and that the lethal act was in furtherance of the
agreed-upon concerted action." (R.,pp.284-86.)
The district court denied the renewed I.C.R. 29 motion. (Tr., p. 1536, L.25 - p.1537, L.2.)
In support of this finding, the court again applied the "stream-of-events concept set forth
previously and under the notion of felony murder in this case.. .." (Tr., p.1538, Ls.16-18.)
On June 29", the district court placed Mr. Pina under oath and questioned him about
whether he intended to testify on his own behalf. Mr. Pina testified that he had discussed the
decision of whether to testify with his attorneys, he was aware that he could he cross-examined,
and that he understood that he had the right to remain silent and the jury could be so instructed.

(Tr., p.1503, L.7

-

p.1505, L.5.) Mr. Pina then informed the district court that he wished to

testify on his own behalf. (Tr., p.1505,Ls.2-4.)
On the last day of trial, June 30", and during the lunch hour, defense counsel conferred
with Mr. Pina. (See Tr., p.1608, L.18.) During this time, Mr. Pina banged on the doors, entered
the dressing room, began taking off his civilian clothing and demanded to be given his jail
clothing. (Tr., p.1607, L.15- p.1608, L.12.) Thereafter, Mr. Pina refused to return to the
courtroom, informing Deputy Sugden that "it's a mistrial, I want a new attorney." (Tr., p.1608,
Ls.7-12.) The district court gave counsel the opportunity to meet again with Mr. Pina, and "to
tell him that the court is ordering him to appear." (Tr., p. 1609, Ls. 12-14.) Eleven minutes later
counsel for Mr. Pina returned to court and stated, "I visited with Mr. Pina in the jail, along with
[co-counsel]. Mr. Pina declined to speak to us. I advised him of the court's order, and he
indicated that he did no want to come to court." (Tr., p.1611, Ls.8-12.)
Based upon Mr. Pina's failure to return to court, the district court found that Mr. Pina had
"purposely" waived his "right and obligation to be here." (Tr., p.1612, Ls.7-12.) After the
prosecutor inquired regarding Mr. Pina's stated desire to testify, the district court found that:
Well, if he's refusing to speak to his lawyers, who would obviously, I think, tell
him how crucial it is for him to come and testify, knowing he was supposed to do
that and wanting to do that, I think that the record speaks for itself, that he's
knowingly waived that as well and he's not here voluntarily.
(Tr., p.1615, L.22 - p.1616, L.3.) Thereafter, Deputy Sugden reentered the courtroom and
informed the district court that, "I've been informed by the jail that he will attend and come up
only if he can grab his papers and represent himself at this point."

(Tr., p.1617, Ls.1-3.)

Thereafter the district court took a recess to consider the issue. (Tr., p.1617, Ls.4-7.)
From the time counsel returned to court, through the district court's findings that
Mr. Pina had waived his right to be present at trial, and his right to testify, to the time the district

court took a break to consider Mr. Pina's request to represent himself, a total of eight minutes
hadelapsed. (Tr.,p.1611,L.l,p.1617, L.8.)
Five minutes later, the district court reconvened, and the court stated:
the defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself. I don't believe I can,
from here, ad hoc rule that he has waived that right based on his conduct. I
believe I have to bring him up and make a Faretta inquiry for pro se litigants as to
his desires, his purposes for this, if they are dilatory, if he's trying to delay these
proceedings, or has some ulterior motive, those kids of things, also to make sure
that if he does this, what the risks are, what it means in terms of where we are in
the case, and that you have had time, [trial counsel], to speak with him prior to us
having this hearing.
(Tr., p.1618, Ls.5-17.) Counsel for the State then presented the district court with a copy of Slate

v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002), arguing that the request for selfrepresentation could he denied has having been untimely brought.

(Tr., p.1619, Ls.6-22.)

Following another brief, five minute recess, the district court reconvened and, without any
further inquiry, denied Mr. Pina's request because the request had been made after the
empanelment of the jury. (Tr., p.1621, Ls.5-16.) When trial counsel asked whether the district
court would still be conducting the F'avettal hearing, the court stated, "I don't think I have to
have him here or go through a Faretta inquiry, because its irrelevant to me; it's untimely. So we
are proceeding with that ruling." (Tr., p. 1621, L.21 - p.1622, L.5.) Trial counsel then asked that
Deputy Sugden relay the ruling to Mr. Pina,
Three minutes later, the court again reconvened. (Tr., p.1622, L.20, p.1623, L.1.) Deputy
Sugden reported:

I went down with the instruction that we would bring him back up, and I was
informed by Sergeant Kinyon that, to inform him, that he would not be allowed to
represent himself - represent himself. He was about halfway up the hall. He said,
and I quote, "Fuck you then, I ain't going." And I put - I asked him if he'd just

Favetta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,819,95 S. Ct. 2525,2533,45 L.Ed.2d 562,572 (1975).
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step in holding five for a minute so I could inform you, and he said, "Fine," and
he sits in there and refuses to go any farther.
(Tr., p.1623, Ls.10-15.) The district court reiterated its ruling that Mr. Pina had "voluntarily
absented himself' from the proceedings and informed counsel that the court would instruct the
jury that Mr. Pina's absence from the trial was not relevant to determining his guilt or innocence.
(Tr., p.1623, Ls.18-22.) Thereafter, the trial commenced without Mr. Pina. (See Tr., p.1625,
Ls.1-22.) The defense immediately rested its case, and the State informed the court that it had no
evidence to offer in rebuttal. (Tr., p.1625, Ls.24-25, p.1626 Ls.3-4.) The district court then took
a recess in order to allow jurors to obtain any items they may need while sequestered, and to
conduct a jury instruction conference. (Tr., p.1627, L.6 - p.1627, L.8.)
At the jury instruction conference, trial counsel again renewed her argument on the issue
of sufficient evidence of the agency theory, and also requested:
that the court find that such an issue is an appropriate one for the trier of
fact,. ...they also, we contend, need to be instructed that, before they can address
the issue of felony murder, that they have to find that there was an acting in
concert between these individuals or that one was the agent of the other.. ..
(6129106 Tr., p.10, L.ll

-

p.11, L.6.)

The state again objected and asserted that the agency

theory was not the law in Idaho, and that the jury should not be instructed on a law that doesn't
exist. (6129106 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-22.) The district court recognized that the issue was one of first
impression in Idaho, and declined to give the requested instructions on agency. (Tr., p.16, L.16 p.17, L.24.) Instead, the district court gave the following instruction on felony murder.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Felony Murder in the First
Degree, the state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about November 29,2005,

2.

in the State of Idaho,

3.

the defendant Juan Carlos Fuentes-Pina, A.K.A. Juan Pina, A.K.A.
Juan Carlos Pina, kidnapped, or attempted to kidnap Jesse Naranjo,
and

4.

during the commission or attempted commission of the
kidnapping, Jesse Naranjo was killed.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(J.I. No.22.) Based upon this instruction, the Jury returned a verdict of guilty of First Degree
Felony Murder. (R., p.290.)
Thereafter, Mr. Pina filed a Motion for a New Trial, which was denied by the district
court. (R., pp.375-76, 393-416, 420-454.) The district court then imposed a unified sentence of
life, with thirty years fixed, upon Mr. Pina. (R., pp.463-467.) Mr. Pina filed a Notice of Appeal
timely from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., p.469.)

1.

The State failed to present any evidence to support a finding that Mr. Pina and Mr. Shores
were acting in concert with one another when Mr. Shores killed Mr. Naranjo. Was
Mr. Pina denied due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution when he was convicted absent proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime of felony murder?

2.

Regardless of whether Idaho's felony murder statute imposes felony murder liability
under either an agency theory or a proximate cause theory, did the district court e n when
it gave the jury instructions which allowed the jurors to convict Mr. Pina under a strict
liability theory?

3.

Did the district court err when, without any inquiry into the merit of the reason for
discharge, the quality of counsel's representation prior to the request, whether any
disruptive effect would result from the discharge, the rationale for the timing of the
request, the complexity and stage of the proceedings, and any prior requests by the
defendant to discharge counsel it denied his mid-trial motion to proceed pro se?

ARGUMENT

I.
Mr. I'ina Was
. Ilcnied Due Process <)f Law As (iuaranteed By '['he Founcen~liAmendment 01'
&U!li!ed
Slates co&io~l
\IiIien Hc' Was Convictecl Absent ProgfUl3 A Reasonablg
Doubt Of Every Fact Necessary To Constitute The Crime Of Felony Murder

.
.

A.

Introduction
Mr. Pina was convicted of felony murder. Because the common law defines the elements

of felony murder in Idaho, and the common law rule clearly required a finding that Mr. Pina was
acting in concert with Mr. Shores or in furtherance of a common object or purpose at the time
Mr. Shores killed Mr. Naranjo, the State was obligated to offer sufficient evidence to support
such a finding.

However, the evidence presented only established that Mr. Shores was

attempting to thwart or end the alleged kidnapping of Mr. Naranjo. Thus, Mr. Pina asserts that
he was denied his right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States constitution when he was convicted in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute that crime.
B.

Under Idaho's Felony Murder Statute, In Order For A Defendant To Be Criminally
Liable for a Killing The Lethal Act Must Be Committed By His Own Hand Or By
Someone Acting In Concert With Him Or In Furtherance Of A Common Object Or
Purpose
1.

The Elements Of Idaho's Felony Murder Statute Include Those Elements Applied
At Common Law

In Idaho, as is relevant to this case, murder is defined as, "the unlawful killing of a human
being ... with malice aforethought." I.C.

3

18-4001. Further, "Such malice may be express or

implied." LC. 5 18-4002. Malice is implied when the killing is "committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate,. ..kidnapping.. .[and] is murder in the first degree." LC.
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18-

4003(d); see also Siaie v. Lanyard, 116 Idaho 860, 866-67, 781 P.2d 197, 203-04 (1989).
However, the scope of felony murder liability imposed by the statutory terms "in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate," language from Idaho Code section 18-4003(d), has yet to be defined
by the Idaho Supreme Court.
In addition to the statutory definition of murder, this Court has recognized that, "Murder
is a common law crime whose complete development required several centuries." Lanwrd, 116
Idaho at 866, 781 P.2d at 203. Thus, in determining the meaning of murder in Idaho, this Court
has looked to the common law definitions of the elements of murder. Id. at 866-67,781 P.2d at
203-04; see also notes to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction number 705 (stating that the common
law defines the elements of felony murder). The general rule is that "common law terminology
will be given its common law meaning, unless a contrary legislative intent appears." State v.

Olin, 111 Idaho 516,519,725 P.2d 801,840 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Moser v. State, 91 Nev. 809,
544 P.2d 424 (1975); Rogers v. Donovan, 268 Or. 24, 518 P.2d 1306 (1974); LaFAVE &
SCOTT $ 2.2, at 110).
[Wlhere Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.

Id. (quoting Moriseite v. UnitedSiaies, 342 U.S. 246,263 (1952)).
These holdings are appropriate because, subject to the inherent power of the legislature to
modify the common law, Idaho has adopted the common law as controlling in its courts. See ID.
CONST.Art. XXI, $ 2 ("All laws now in force in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to

this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation or be altered or
repealed by the legislature."); I.C. $ 73-1 16 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not

repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not
provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.")
With the exception of adding enumerated felonies, the operative language contained in
Idaho's felony murder statute has not been materially changed since it was first adopted when
Idaho was a territory of the United States. "All murder ...which shall be committed in the
perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed
murder in the first degree...." IDAHOTERR.LAWS,Crimes and Punishments 5 17 (1864); e.g.,
Revised Statutes of Idaho Territory,
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6562 (1887) ("All murder ...which is committed in the

perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the
first degree."); I.C.

5 7-6562 (1908) ("All inurder ...which is committed in the perpetration of, or

attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the first degree.");
1935 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 24, p.41 ("All murder.. .which is committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem, is inurder ofthe first
degree."); 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 336 (same) and Journal of the State Senate, 2" Regular
Session of the 41StLegislature of the State of Idaho, March 15, 1972 ("In passing S. 1603, it was
the intent of the Senate to re-establish the criminal laws of the State of Idaho exactly as they
were on December 31, 1971."); 1973 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 276 (removing from I.C. 18-4003 the
language "or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnaping [sic] or mayhem."); 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 154 (in part, adding
to I.C. 18-4003 the language "(d) Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem is murder of the first degree.").

Further, as the below discussion indicates, at the time that the operable language from
Idaho Code section 18-4003(d) was adopted, the common law understanding of felony murder
liability encompassed an agency theory of liability.
2.

Under The Common Law, Felonv Murder Liabilitv Extended Only To Acts
Perpetrated Bv Co-Felons Acting In Concert, Or Confederated, With The
Defendant

The meaning of the language in Idaho's 1864 felony murder statute and, hence, the same
language contained within the current statute, can he deciphered by considering the common law
felony murder rule it was intended to codify. In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541
(1863), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the question of whether, under
the common law definition of felony murder, a rioter could be held criminally liable for the
killing of an innocent bystander caused by a soldier attempting to repel the felonious act of
rioting. The court began by recognizing:
There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in the
commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for ail the consequences
which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and
confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he is liable criminaliter
for the acts of each and all who participate with him in the execution of the
unlawful design. As they all act in concert for a common object, each is the agent
of all the others, and the acts done are therefore the acts of each and all.

Campbell, 89 Mass. at 543-44. In so holding, the court relied upon common law treatises
typically relied upon by courts of the day, and "to which many others of a similar tenor might he
added.. ..". Id. at 544 (citing 1 Hale P.C. 441 and 1 East P.C. 257). The court concluded that the
citations recognized a "reasonable limitation that the particular act of one of a party for which his
associates and confederates are to be held liable must be shown to have been done for the
firtherance or in prosecution of the common object and design for which they combined
together." Id. Thus,

No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or
constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his
own hand or by some one acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a
common object or purpose.

Id.
The real distinction is between acts which a man does either actually or
constructively, by himself or his agents or confederates, and those which were
done by others acting not in concert with him or to effect a common object, but
without his lcnowledge or assent, either express or implied. For the former the law
holds him strictly responsible, and for all their necessary and natural
consequences, which he is rightfully deemed to have contemplated and intended.
For the latter he is not liable, because they are not done by himself or by those
with whom he is associated, and no design to commit them or intent to bring
about the results which flow from them can be reasonably imputed to him.

Campbell, 89 Mass. at 546.
With the exception of the enumerated felonies, Idaho's felony murder statute mirrors
California's early statute on the subject. See 1856 Cal. Stat. Ch. 139, 5 21 ("All murder ...which
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or
burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree."). In applying this law, in a series of cases,
the Supreme Court of California recognized that liability for felony murder was premised upon
the fact that the parties were confederated together for the purpose of committing a felony. First,
in People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 576 (1865), the court noted the basis for the liability.
By the act of the defendant's conspiring with those who were with him when the
deceased was slain, to commit robbery and to resist arrest even to the taking of
life, they jointly assumed to themselves, as a body, the attribute of individuality,
so far as regarded the prosecution of the common design, thus rendering whatever
was done or said by any one ofthem in furtherance of that design a part of the res
gesta?, and therefore the act of all.

Id. at 576 (citing 3 Greenl. Ev.,
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Similarly, in People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560 (1875), the

court premised liability on the fact that the killing was committed by a co-felon. "If the
homicide in question was committed by one of his associates engaged in the robbery, in

furtherance of their common purpose to rob, he is as accountable as though his own hand had
intentionally given the fatal blow, and is guilty of murder in the first degree." Id. at 563
Subsequently, in People v. Olsen, 22 P . 125 (1889), the court recognized that, the liability of
another for the killing by a co-felon was "their liability as conspirators," and in regards to a
felony murder instruction, "the instruction only goes to a case where the conspiracy to commit a
felony, and the attempt to commit it are shown.. .." Id. at 126.
In People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 (1965), the California Supreme Court revisited
the issue of a felon's criminal liability when the killing is not accomplished by a co-felon.
Again interpreting language identical to the operative language in the Idaho statute, the court
found:
When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his
victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is not
committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. It is not
enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the robbery
might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing. (4) Section 189
requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing, for if he does not, the
killing is not committed to perpetrate the felony.

Id. at 781
In addition to California, Utah's early felony murder statute mirrored the operative
language of Idaho's current felony murder statute. See 1898 Utah Comp. Rev. Statutes 3 4454
("Every murder ...committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape,
burglary, or robbery.. .is murder in the first degree."). In addressing the question of whether a
man could be held liable for a murder possibly accomplished by his co-felon, the Supreme Court
of Utah recognized that:
even if the killing was not directly traced to the defendant, still the record shows
that, in connection with their criminal acts, these two men were acting in concert
to rob and resist arrest, even to the killing of other persons; and, being so
associated and confederated together in their felonious purposes of robbery and

resistance to the civil power of the state, the killing of the deceased, by
whomsoever it was done, was the act of each and both of the conspirators, and
thereby the defendant is chargeable therewith, whether he or his companion fire
the fatal shot.

State v. Morgan, 61 P. 527, 530 (1900) (emphasis added). Notably, Morgan was not charged
with the murder of his co-felon who was killed by a member of the sheriffs posse. See Id. at

Massachusetts, California, and Utah were not alone in recognizing that the common law
applied felony murder liability only for ltillings accomplished by a person that conspired or
confederated with the charged felon. Early federal courts adopted similar rules. See e.g., United

States v. Boyd, 45 F. 851, 868 (W.D. Ark. 1890) (instructing the jury that felony murder liability
attaches "provided all are proven to have confederated and engaged in a common design of
which the perpetration of the criine is a part." (citing 6 Crim.L.Mag, p.351)); United States v.

Ross, 27 F. Cas. 899, 901 (C.C.R.I. 1813) (No. 16,196) (recognizing that, "If a number of
persons conspire together to do any unlawful act and death happens from any thing done in the
prosecution of the design, it is murder in all, who take part in the same transaction" and holding
defendant liable because he was "actually present on board, aiding and assisting in

accomplishing the project by all the means in his power.. .." (emphasis added)).
Throughout the history of the United States, many state courts have also recognized that
the agency theory of felony murder liability was the common law rule. See Lamb v. People, 96
111. 73 (111. 1880) (holding that felony murder liability applies to co-conspirators "because the

action which caused the death was consented to by both."); Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338 (111.
1888) (reversing conviction where officer, in attempt to break up group disturbing the peace,
shot bystander because, "there was no concert of action whatever between him and them. There
was no common design or purpose existing between the two defendants and [the officer]. They

had not assembled or come together for the commission of any unlawful a~t.");~
State v. Weems,
65 N.W. 387 (Iowa 1895) (approving a jury instruction which stated that, "If.. . persons conspire
or confederate together to commit an unlawful act, and, in pursuit of such conspiracy and
commission of such unlawful act, such persons, or either of them, aided and abetted by the other,
takes the life of or kills a human being, such taking of life is murder."); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 88 S.W. 1085 (Ky. 1905) (dismissing indictment that charged co-felons with felony
murder when victim was shot by person attempting to defend against robbery, and adopting rule
from Campbell and Butler, supra); People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d 739 (N.Y. 1960) (holding "in
order for a felon to be guilty of the homicide, the act (as in agency) must be 'either actually or
constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or
by some one acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose."'
(quoting Campbell, supra)); State v. Oxendine, 122 S.E. 568 (N.C. 1924) (vacating felony
murder conviction because killer and defendant were "not acting in concert; they were
adversaries."); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (recognizing that
"felony murder is limited to acts committed by the accused or his accomplices which actually
produce death," and statute required murder be in the "perpetration" or "attempted perpetration"
of crime, but killing of co-felon by the victim "resulted from the effort to thwart rather than
perpetrate the felony."); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811 (Va. 1981) (finding that
malice was element of murder, and malice could not be imputed to defendant because shooter
was not co-felon and there was no evidence shooter killed other co-felon with malice).

As is discussed in subsection 3, in&,

Illinois has since abandoned the common law view.
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3.

The Belated Adoption Of The Minority View Of Proximate-Cause Felony Murder
Liability Was Not Premised Upon The Common Law understanding Of Felony
Murder Liability

Despite the fact that in the 1800's the Illinois courts had adhered to the common law
"agency theory" of felony murder liability in Lamb and Butler, supra, in People v. Krauser, 146
N.E. 593 (Ill. 1925), the Supreme Court of Illinois, found that felony murder liability, as opposed
to manslaughter liability, attached where a victim may have shot himself as "such a result might
reasonably have been anticipated when he started to rob at the point of a revolver," and "The
shooting. . . was a consequence naturally to be expected from the plaintiff in error's acts." Id. at
505-06. Notably, the court did not address or even recognize its prior holdings in Butler or

Lamb, supra, nor did it cite to any authority which had applied this "proximate cause" theory oE
liability for felony murder. Ten years later, and relying solely upon Krauser, the Supreme Court
of Illinois again applied a proximate cause theory to felony murder holding that, "It reasonably
might be anticipated that an attempted robbery would meet with resistance, during which the
victim might be shot either by himself or some one else in attempting to prevent the robbery, and
those attempting to perpetuate the robbery would be guilty of murder." People v. Payne, 194
N.E. 539,543 (Ill. 1935).
When the Supreme Court of Illinois was subsequently asked to revisit the question of
whether this was a correct statement of the law of felony murder, the court determined that
Illinois did, in fact, follow the proximate cause theory. People v. Lowevy, 687 N.E.2d 973 (Ill.
1997). In doing so, the court noted that it was "sound public policy." Id. at 976. The court also
found that Illinois had previously followed the agency theory, hut that the intent of the Illinois
legislature was to follow the proximate cause theory as that was included in the committee
comments attached to the currently enacted legislation. Id. at 977.

As in Illinois, New York later abandoned the agency theory of felony murder liability in
favor of a proximate cause theory. See People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993). This
was not a result of a change in interpretation of the common law theory of liability, but rather
due to legislative action in 1965 which altered the law to apply liability where "either the
defendant or an accomplice 'causes the death of a person other than one of the participants."' Id.
at 663 (citing Penal Law § 125.25[3]). The "causes the death" language adopted by the
legislature "is used consistently throughout article 125 and has been construed to mean that
homicide is properly charged when the defendant's culpable act is 'a sufficiently direct cause' of
the death so that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable." Id. After a review of the
legislative history of the new statute, the Court of Appeals of New York determined that the
intent of the legislature was to adopt a proximate cause theory of liability. Id. at 665.
The Supreme Court of Michigan also adopted the proximate cause theory of felony
murder liability, though not based upon a change in statute. In People v. Podolski, 52 N.W. 2d
201 (1952), the court adopted the reasoning of a Pennsylvania case to justify it's holding. Id. at
204 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 53 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1947)). The court also cited Taylor v.

State, 63 S.W. 330 (Tx. Crim. App. 1901) (holding that felony murder instruction given
complied with requirements of Taylor v. State, 55 S.W. 961(Tex. Crim. App. 1900)), and

Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934). The error in the court's reasoning, however, was
articulated in a subsequent case from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which reaffirmed the
agency theory. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958).
In Redline, the court first noted that in Moyer "the contention that it was immaterial who
filed the fatal shot was never raised in the court below," such that comments on the proximate
cause theory in felony murder were "dictum," "a palpable gratuity," and "no more than an

expression of the opinion writer's individual view concerning a matter corum non judice."

Redline, 137 A.2d at 48-81. In addition, the Redline court distinguished the other cases relied
upon by the Supreme Court of Michigan, finding that "in the so-called 'shield' cases, where a
felon uses the interposition of the body of an illnocent person to escape harm in flight from the
scene of his crime, the malice is express." Id. at 482 (citing Kealon v. State, 57 S.W. 1125 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1900); Taylor v. State, 55 S.W. 961(Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (recognizing that agency
rule articulated in Campbell and Butler was correct statement of the law, but holding that in this
case felony murder liability attached not due to agency with the third-party shooter, but rather
through agency with the co-felon who forced, the victim, through threats, to do an act which is
likely to produce the victim's death, and which did cause his death, a recognized separate theory
of liability for murder under the common law); and Wilson, supva (recognizing that agency rule
articulated in Campbell and Moore was correct statement of the law, but holding that in this case
felony murder liability attached not due to agency with the third-party shooter, but rather through
agency with the co-felon who "kidnapped" the victim, i.e. forced, the victim, through threats, to
go to a place of danger. "Appellant's action in forcing [the victim] to a place which was known
by him to be perilous was just as much the case of his death as if he had himself fired the fatal
shot.")).
4.

The Controlling Law In Idaho Is The Common Law Agency Theory Of Felony Murder
Liability Pursuant To Which, The Act Must Be Committed BY His Own Hand Or BY
Someone Acting In Concert With Him Or In Furtherance Of A Common Object Or
Purpose
As the above authority shows, the common law agency theory of liability was necessarily

the law of the State of Idaho at the time the Idaho constitution was adopted, as that was the only
legal theory that existed in 1888. ID. CONST.Art. XXI,
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In addition, the common law is the

law of Idaho so long as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, either the United States or
Idaho Constitutions, or the statutes of Idaho. I.C. 5 73-1 16. Because the common law agency
theory of felony murder is neither repugnant to, nor inconsistent with, either the United States
Constitution or Idaho law, it is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Furthermore, the proximate cause theory of felony murder liability has been recognized
as available to states since at least 1925. Despite this fact, the Idaho Legislature has not
indicated a desire to adopt that minority view. Since 1925, the legislature has re-codified the
felony murder statute, added enumerated felonies, repealed the statute altogether, and re-adopted
the statute, but still has not indicated a desire to stray from the common law understanding of
felony murder liability, through alteration of the statute's operative language or the adoption of a
statement of legislative intent.
As was recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, "it appears that
extension of the felony-murder rule beyond its common law limitation to acts by the felon and
his accomplice, to include the lethal actions of those not acting in pursuance of the felonious
scheme, is an appropriate action for the legislature.. . not the courts." Severs, 759 S.W.2d at 938;

see also In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 263, 912 P.2d 614, 631 (1995) ('[tlhe
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature alone.... It is
the duty of the courts to interpret the meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the
possible results."' Id. (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,369 P.2d 1010 (1961)).
The controlling law in Idaho is the common law agency theory of felony murder liability
pursuant to which, "No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or
constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or

by some one acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose."

Campbell, 89 Mass. at 544
C.

Mr. Pina Was Denied Due Process Of Law As Guaranteed By The Fourteenth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution When He Was Convicted Absent Proof
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Of Every Fact Necessary To Constitute The Crime Of
Felony Murder
Upon the completion of the presentation of the State's case-in-chief, counsel for Mr. Pina

moved, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, for "a dismissal of this case." (Tr., p.1390, Ls.1619.) Counsel specifically premised the motion on the fact that the State had failed to offer
evidence that Mr. Pina and Mr. Shores were acting in concert at the time of the killing.
Various cases indicate that when an individual is involved in a homicide and that
there is liability to be determined, the individual who is not the person who
commits the ltilliug can only be liable if the person who actually commits the
killing, who actually commits the homicide, is his agent. There has been no such
common design, no such agency shown.
(Tr., p.1391, L.22-p.I392,L.15.)
Although the State objected to the motion, Counsel for the State acknowledged, "We
don't assert that Mr. Shores was in on the plan, whatever there was, to kidnap, for whatever
purposes, Mr. Naranjo at the time that Mr. Pina brought him into the house." (Tr., p.1394, L.14
- p.1396,

L.25.) Instead, the State asserted, "once Mr. Shores was activated, he was clearly not

on the side of Jesse Naranjo. He was acting with Mr. Pina against Mr. Naranjo." (Tr., p.1395,
L.25 - p.1396, L.2.) In further argument on the issue, counsel for the State argued that "there
was some form of co-acting on the part of these two people." (Tr., p.1400, Ls.5-6.)
The district court denied the I.C.R. 29 motion. (Tr., p.1403, Ls.5-10.) In doing so, the
district court essentially adopted a "stream-of-events" theory of felony murder, finding that:
I believe the Idaho Code is very clear in that regard, and if the killing occurs, it
does not, our statute does not require a killing to be by the person who initiated

the kidnapping and indeed is silent as to that effect. I believe that silence leaves
for this court to view this matter, not narrowly under the agency theory, but rather
the decision for the jury whether the stream of events is such that this defendant
should be held liable for the felony murder of Mr. Naranjo.
(Tr., p.1405, Ls. 1-9.)
During the defense's case-in-chief, trial counsel renewed the I.C.R. 29 motion, noting
that the "in-the-stream-of-events" cases which the district court had apparently relied upon had
all been cases in which there was, "no doubt that the parties were acting in concert."
(Tr., p.1531, Ls.23-25, p.1532, Ls.21-25.)
Without conceding that the defense was correct in its assertion that an unlawful act that
the parties set out to jointly accomplish was necessary, counsel for the State argued that such was
shown by the facts of the case. (See Tr., p.1534, Ls.9-18.) Specifically, the state asserted:
I think that the court can find evidence that's been presented that shows that at
some point they were acting together. They were both fighting this same man. It
was two people fighting one person. They were both struggling for the same gun,
the gun which Mr. Pina brought to the fight and the gun which Mr. Shores ended
up shooting the person that both of them were struggling against. You know, I
think that that evidence alone shows some acting in concert, at least acting, acting
at the same time for a common goal, that is, fighting Mr. Naranjo.. ..Whether they
had sat down in advance and planned that this is what they were going to do is not
relevant. The question of whether they were both acting illegally and both acting
for a common purpose I think can be answered in the affirmative based on what
the evidence presented.

The district court denied the renewed I.C.R. 29 motion. (Tr., p.1536, L.25 - p.1537, L.2.)
In support of this finding, the court again applied the "stream-of-events concept set forth
previously and under the notion of felony murder in this case.. .." (Tr., p.1538, Ls.16-18.)
Because "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged," if this court determines that there was insufficient evidence to support Mr. Pina's

conviction, the conviction must be vacated. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also

Burh v. US., 437 U.S. 1, 16, n.10 (1978) ("In holding the evidence insufficient to sustain guilt,

an appellate court determines that the prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."). This principle is articulated in Idaho Criminal Rule 29 which states:
(a) Motion before submission to jury. The court on motion of the defendant or on
its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such
offense or offenses.

Id On review, the Idaho Appellate courts must determine whether "the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged." State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930, 877 P.2d 898,
901 (1994). The court examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could
conclude beyond a reasonahle doubt that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the
offense was proven. State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352,355,913 P.2d 568,571 (1996).
Mr. Pina asserts that the record before this Court does not contain evidence sufficient
such that a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a reasonahle doubt that Mr. Shore's act of
shooting Mr. Naranjo was "either actually or constructively his," because there is no evidence
that the act was committed "by some one acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a
common object or purpose." Campbell, 89 Mass. at 544.
The evidence offered during the trial established that Johnny did not conspire with
Mr. Pina to commit the felony of kidnapping. As the State candidly acknowledged, "We don't
assert that Mr. Shores was in on the plan, whatever there was, to kidnap, for whatever purposes,
Mr. Naranjo at the time that Mr. Pina brought him into the house." (Tr., p.1394, L.14 - p.1396,
L.25.)
In addition, the evidence offered showed, not that Mr. Shores was acting in furtherance of
a "common object or purpose" when he fought with and ultimately shot Mr. Naranjo, but rather

was actually attempting to thwart Mr. Pina's actions. Mr. Shores became involved in the
altercation between Mr. Pina and Mr. Naranjo because his girlfriend told him to "make them stop
or something and - or take care of this." (Tr., p.1282, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Shores approached Carlos,
told Mr. Naranjo to "get up," and ordered Mr. Pina to give him the gun. When Mr. Pina
wouldn't, Mr. Shores repeated, "Come on, Carlos. Give me the gun." Mr. Pina relented, and
gave the gun to Mr.Shores. (Tr., p.1282, L.21 -p.1283, L.25; p.1284, L.2;p.1284, L.13

-

p.1285, L.21.) These are not the acts of a person working in furtherance of a kidnapping, but
rather a person attempting to end one.
Further, when Mr. Shores fought with Mr. Naranjo over the gun, he did so because he
had been tackled, and believed that if he tried to run he would be shot. (Tr., p.1166, Ls.2-7,
p.1221, Ls.8-16, p.1286, Ls.17-25.) Mr. Shores didn't simply fight with Mr. Naranjo over the
gun, he also fought against Mr. Pina for control over the gun. (See Tr., p.1221, Ls.1-2 (all three
were wrestling for the gun), p.1286, L.25 ("we all fought for the gun.")). After Mr. Shores
wrested control of the gun away from the other two, Mr. Naranjo and Mr. Pina continued to
fight, but Mr. Shores yelled at them to "Knock it off." (Tr., p.1287, L.1 - p.1288, L.14.)
Finally, when Mr. Shores actually shot Mr. Naranjo, it wasn't furtherance of a
kidnapping. Rather, Mr. Shores was "scared and panicked and didn't know what to do, and I just
fired the gun." (Tr., p.1289, Ls.5-7.) "Carlos was in the way right there, right in front of him,
and then I just fired the gun." (Tr., p.1374, Ls.16-18.) He later explained that, "I'd probably
consider that the warning shot. Just, I wasn't aiming to hit anybody. I just shot." Johnny wasn't
even sure he intended to fire the gun, "I don't even know. I don't think - it's just like a reaction.
I don't know. I was just scared. It just happened.. ..I wasn't aiming. I was just

- well,

no. I

don't know. I can't really say. It just

-

it just happened too fast ...Didn't think about anything

really." (Tr.,p.1377, L.22-p.1378, L.9.)
Based upon this evidence, a reasonable mind could not conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Shore's act of shooting Mr. Naranjo was "either actually or constructively"
Mr. Pina's, because there is no evidence that the act was committed "by some one acting in
concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose." Campbell, 89 Mass. at 544.
Because the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime of felony
murder, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Pina's I.C.R. 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal. See State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 873, 26 P.3d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 2001); State v.

Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 909, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (Ct. App. 2000). In addition, this Court must
vacate Mr. Pina's conviction because there is insufficient evidence to support it. See i n re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1, 16, n.10 (1978).

Regardless Of Whether Idaho's Felony Murder Statue Imposes Felony Murder Liability Under
Either An Agency Theory Or A Proximate Cause Theory, The District Court Erred When It
Gave The Jury Instructions Which Allowed The Jurors To Convict Mr. Pina Under A Strict
Liability Theory
A.

Introduction
The district court instructed the jury that Mr. Pina could be convicted of felony murder if

"during the commission or attempted commission of the kidnapping, Jesse Naranjo was killed."
Mr. Pina submits that this is a misstatement of the law under either the agency theory or the
proximate cause theory of liability for felony murder, and instead imposes strict liability for all
killings which occur contemporaneously with the underlying felony. Because the district court's

erroneous jury instruction misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Pina, the error in giving the
instruction was reversible.
B.

Regardless Of Whether Idaho's Felony Murder Statue Imposes Felony Murder Liability
Under Either An Agency Theory Or A Proximate Cause Theorv, The District Court Erred
When It Gave The Jury Instructions Which Allowed The Jurors To Convict Mr. Pina
Under A Strict Liability Theory
In it's initial instructions to the jury, the district court instructed the jurors that, "Under

the felony murder rule, a defendant who participates in a kidnapping can be held liable for the
death of any person killed during the commission of that kidnapping, regardless of the
individual's intent that a death occur." (J.I. No.12.)
At a subsequent jury instruction conference, trial counsel renewed the argument on the
issue of sufficient evidence of the agency theory, and also requested:
that the court find that such an issue is an appropriate one for the trier of
fact,. ...they also, we contend, need to be instructed that, before they can address
the issue of felony murder, that they have to find that there was an acting in
concert between these individuals or that one was the agent of the other.. ..
(6129106 Tr., p.10, L.ll

- p.11,

L.6; see also R., pp.284-86.) The state objected, asserting the

agency theory of felony murder liability was not the law in Idaho, and that the jury should not be
instructed on a law that didn't exist. (6129106 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-22.) The district court recognized
that the issue was one of first impression in Idaho, and declined to give the requested
instructions. (Tr., p.16, L.16 - p.17, L.24.) Instead, the district court gave the following
instruction on felony murder.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Felony Murder in the First
Degree, the state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about November 29,2005,

2.

in the State of Idaho,

3.

the defendant Juan Carlos Fuentes-Pina, A.K.A. Juan Pina, A.K.A.
Juan Carlos Pina, kidnapped, or attempted to kidnap Jesse Naranjo,
and

4.

during the commission or attempted commission of the
kidnapping, Jesse Naranjo was killed.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(J.I. No.22.) Based upon this instruction, the Jury returned a verdict of guilty of First Degree
Felony Murder. (R., p.290.)
The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which Idaho appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998) When
reviewing jury instructions, the court must first ask whether the instructions as a wliole, and not
individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370,372,
64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002) (citing Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 1089.) To be reversible
error, instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. Id.
1.

Assuming Armendo, That There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support The Jury
Verdict, The District Court Still Erred When It Failed To Properly Instruct The
Jury That In Order To Find Mr. Pina Guiltv Of Felony Murder They Must
Unanimously Find. Bevond A Reasonable Doubt, That Mr. Shores Was Acting In
Concert With Mr. Pina

Mr. Pina asserts that, assuming arguendo that there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Shore's act of shooting Mr. Naranjo was
"either actually or constructively his," because Mr. Shores was "acting in concert with" Mr. Pina
or "in furtherance of a common object or purpose," the question was one of fact which should
have been submitted to the jury. In addition, the jury instructions given affirmatively misstated
the law such that they misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Pina.

Jury instructions must correctly inform the jury as to the elements of the crime charged.

State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil,
541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004)). As was argued in section I(B), supra, under Idaho law, Mr. Pina
could only be held guilty of felony murder if the act of shooting Mr. Naranjo was either actually
or constructively his, because committed either by his own hand or by someone acting in concert
with him or in furtherance of a comnlon object or purpose. As such, the district court erred when
it failed to instruct the jury of this element of felony murder.
Even more problematic is the strict liability theory on which the district court actually
instructed the jury. The district courl's jury instructions not only allowed the jury to convict
Mr. Pina regardless of whether the killing was attributable to him through an agency theory of
liability, it also allowed the jury to convict him simply because the killing occurred "during" the
commission of the alleged kidnapping. Because the only limitation given the jury was temporal,
the jury was instructed that Mr. Pina could be held liable for any killing which occurred
contemporaneously with the alleged kidnapping, even in the absence of any relation between the
two acts. In contrast, the actual felony murder statute requires that the murder be committed "in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate" the underlying felony, clearly requiring more than a
simple temporal relation. See I.C. $ 18-4003(d). Thus, the given jury instructions did not simply
omit a necessary element of the crime of felony murder, they directly misstated the proper theory
of liability.
The district court erred when it gave jury instructions 12 and 22 because each
significantly misstated the elements of felony murder and misled the jury on the proper theory of
liability. In addition, this error prejudiced Mr. Pina as it allowed the jury to convict him absent a

unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he was charged. Thus, the district court's error was reversible error.
2.

Assuming Avpuendo That Idaho's Felony Murder Statute Imposes A Proximate
Cause Theory Of Liability, The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury
On A Strict Liability Theory

The district court's instructions to the jury stated that Mr. Pina was criminally liable for
any killing that occurred "during the commission or attempted comn~ission of the
kidnapping.. .." Even under a proximate cause theory of liability, this is a misstatement of the
law. According to the proximate cause theory of felony murder, "liability attaches ... for any
death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity - notwithstanding the fact that the killing
was by one resisting the crime." People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (1997). In other
words, the defendant is liable for the "direct and foreseeable consequence[s]" of the underlying
felony. Id. at 977. However, a defendant is not liable for coincidental acts or where there is an
intervening cause. C j , id. at 978. Nevertheless, according to the district court's instructions, the
jury could convict Mr. Pina of felony murder even if the jurors believed that Mr. Pina had
abandoned the kidnapping and Mr. Naranjo's action of attacking Mr. Shore and taking the gun
was an intervening cause. Similarly, jurors could convict Mr. Pina if they determined that
Mr. Shores killed Mr. Naranjo because of his own long-standing animosity towards him, or
because he caused the gun to be pointed at Mr. Shores' girlfriend, simply because the killing was
coincidental with the alleged kidnapping.
The district court erred when it gave jury instructions 12 and 22 because they
significantly misstated even the proximate cause theory of felony murder liability. In addition,
this error prejudiced Mr. Pina as it allowed the jury to convict him absent a unanimous finding

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he was
charged. Thus, the district court's error was reversible error.

The The ~istrictCourt Erred When, Without Conducting A Proper Inquiry, It Denied Mr. Pina's
Mid-Trial Motion To Proceed Pro Se
A.

Introduction
When, on the last day of trial, the district court was informed that Mr. Pina wished to

discharge counsel and proceed pro se, the district court denied the motion based simply upon the
fact that the motion had not been made prior to the empanelment of the jury. The district court
did not inquire into the reasons for the request or their merit, the quality of counsel's
representation prior to the request, whether discharge would have any disruptive effects on the
proceedings, or the complexity and stage of the proceedings. Mr. Pina asserts that in arbitrarily
denying his request to proceed pro se, the district court abused its discretion and committed
reversible error.

B.

The The District Court Erred When, Without Conducting A Proper Inquiry, It Denied
Mr. Pina's Mid-Trial Motion To Proceed Pro Se
On June 29Ih, the district court placed Mr. Pina under oath and questioned him about

whether he intended to testify on his own behalf. Mr. Pina testified that he had discussed the
decision of whether to testify with his attorneys, he was aware that he could be cross-examined,
and that he understood that he had the right to remain silent and the jury could be so instructed.
(Tr., p.1503, L.7 - p.1505, L.5.) Mr. Pina then informed the district court that he wished to
testify on his own behalf. (Tr., p.1505, Ls.2-4.)

The next day, prior to Mr. Pina testifying, and during the lunch hour, defense counsel
conferred with Mr. Pina. (See Tr., p.1608, L.18.) During this time, Mr. Pina banged on the
doors, entered the dressing room, began taking off his civilian clothing and demanded to be
given his jail clothing. (Tr., p.1607, L.15- p.1608, L.12.) Thereafter, Mr. Pina refused to return
to the courtroom, informing Deputy Sugden that "it's a mistrial, I want a new attorney."
(Tr., p.1608, Ls.7-12.) The district court gave counsel the opportunity to meet again with
Mr.Pina, and "to tell him that the court is ordering him to appear." (Tr., p.1609, Ls.12-14.)
Eleven minutes later counsel for Mr. Pina returned to court and stated, "I visited with Mr. Pina in
the jail, along with [co-counsel]. Mr. Pina declined to speak to us. I advised him of the court's
order, and he indicated that he did no want to come to court." (Tr., p.1611, Ls.8-12.)
Based upon Mr. Pina's failure to return to court, the district court found that Mr. Pina had
"purposely" waived his "right and obligation to be here." (Tr., p.1612, Ls.7-12.) After the
prosecutor inquired regarding Mr. Pina's stated desire to testify, the district court found that:
Well, if he's refusing to speak to his lawyers, who would obviously, I think, tell
him how crucial it is for him to come and testify, knowing he was supposed to do
that and wanting to do that, I think that the record speaks for itself, that he's
knowingly waived that as well and he's not here voluntarily.
(Tr., p.1615, L.22 - p.1616, L.3.) Thereafter, Deputy Sugden reentered the cou&oom and
informed the district court that, "I've been informed by the jail that he will attend and come up
only if he can grab his papers and represent himself at this point."

(Tr., p.1617, Ls.1-3.)

Thereafter the district court took a recess to consider the issue. (Tr., p.1617, Ls.4-7.)
From the time counsel returned to court, through the district court's findings that
Mr. Pina had waived his right to be present at trial, and his right to testify, to the time the district
court took a break to consider Mr. Pina's request to represent himself, a total of eight minutes
hadelapsed. (Tr.,p.1611,L.1,p.l617,L.8.)

Five minutes later, the district court reconvened, and the court stated:
the defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself. I don't believe I can,
from here, ad hoc rule that he has waived that right based on his conduct. I
believe I have to bring him up and make a Faretta inquiry for pro se litigants as to
his desires, his purposes for this, if they are dilatory, if he's trying to delay these
proceedings, or has some ulterior motive, those kids of things, also to make sure
that if he does this, what the risks axe, what it means in terms of where we are in
the case, and that you have had time, [trial counsel], to speak with him prior to us
having this hearing.
(Tr., p.1618, Ls.5-17.) Counsel for the State then presented the district court with a copy of
State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2003), arguing that the request for selfrepresentation could be denied has having been untimely brought. (Tr., p.1619, Ls.6-22.)
Following another brief, five minute recess, the district court reconvened and, without any
further inquiry, denied Mr. Pina's request because the request had been made after the

court would still be conducting the Faretta hearing, the court stated, "I don't think I have to have
him here or go through a Faretta inquiry, because its irrelevant to me; it's untimely. So we are
proceeding with that ruling." (Tr., p.1621, L.21 - p.1622, L.5.) Trial counsel then asked that
Deputy Sugden relay the ruling to Mr. Pina.
Three minutes later, the court again reconvened. (Tr., p.1622, L.20, p.1623, L.1.) Deputy
Sugden reported:
I went down with the instruction that we would bring him back up, and I was
informed by Sergeant Kinyon that, to inform him, that he would not be allowed to
represent himself - represent himself. He was about halfway up the hall. He said,
and I quote, "Fuck you then, I ain't going." And I put - I asked him if he'd just
step in holding five for a minute so I could inform you, and he said, "Fine," and
he sits in there and refuses to go any farther.
(Tr., p.1623, Ls.10-15.) The district court reiterated its ruling that Mr. Pina had "voluntarily
absented himself' from the proceedings and informed counsel that the court would instruct the

jury that Mr. Pina's absence from the trial was not relevant to determining his guilt or innocence.
(Tr., p.1623, Ls.18-22.) Thereafter, the trial commenced without Mr. Pina. (See Tr., p.1625,
Ls.1-22.) The defense immediately rested its case, and the State informed the court that it had no
evidence to offer in rebuttal. (Tr., p.1625, Ls.24-25, p.1626 Ls.3-4.) The district court then took
a recess in order to allow jurors to obtain any items they may need while sequestered, and to
conduct a jury instruction conference. (Tr., p.1627, L.6 - p.1627, L.8.)
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense." Accord Idaho Const. Art. I,

5 13. The Sixth Amendment also affords

a defendant the right to forego the assistance of counsel and to defend himself. Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 819,95 S. Ct. 2525,2533,45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 (1975); accord Idaho
Const. Art. I, $ 13. The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. State v. Reber, 138
Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632, 634 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal of

California, 528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000)). The request for self-representation must be timely. Id.
(citing Martinez and U S . v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir.1988); U S . v. Smith, 780 F.2d
810, 81 1 (9th Cir. 1986)). A motion for self-representation is timely if made prior to the
commencement of meaningful trial proceedings. Id. (citing Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; Smith, 780
F.2d at 81 1; Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.1982)). Empanelment of a jury is a
meaningful trial proceeding; thus, a motion for self-representation after jury empanelment is
untimely. Id. (citing US. v. Schax 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir.1991); Jackon v.nst, 921 F.2d
882, 888 (9th Cir.1990); Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784). Where the request for
self-representation is untimely, it nevertheless may be granted in the trial court's discretion. Id.
at 277-78, 61 P.3d at 634-35 (citing Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; U S . v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908
(2nd Cir.1984)). Therefore, on review the trial court's denial of an untimely motion for self-

representation is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 278, 61 P.3d at 635
(citing Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553).
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). In the present case, Mr. Pina asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Pina's motion for self-representation because
the district court failed to act within the boundaries of its discretion and failed to reach its
decision through an exercise of reason.
Admittedly:
Once the trial has begun with the defendant represented by counsel, however, his
right thereafter to discharge his lawyer and to represent himself is sharply
curtailed. There must be a showing that the prejudice to the legitimate interests of
the defendant overbalances the potential disruption of proceedings already in
progress, with considerable weight being given to the trial judge's assessment of
this balance.

U. S. ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno 348 F.2d 12, 15 (C.A.N.Y. 1965) (citing United States v.
Bentvena, supra, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McMann,
supra, 263 F.2d 940, 943 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Dennis, supra, 183 F.2d 201,234 (2d
Cir. 1950)). When such a mid-trial request for self-representation is presented the trial court
must inquire sua sponte into the specific factors underlying the request thereby ensuring a
meaningful record in the event that appellate review is later required. People v. Windham, 560
P.2d 1187, 1191-1192 (Cal. 1977) (citation omitted); see also State v. Brown, 676 A.2d 513,
525 (Md.1996) (holding "While the trial court has broad discretion, once trial has begun, to

determine whether dismissal of counsel is warranted, the court's discretion is not limitless. The
court must conduct an inquiry to assess whether the defendant's reason for dismissal of counsel
justifies any resulting disruption.").
Among other factors to be considered by the court in assessing such requests
made after the commencement of trial are the quality of counsel's representation
of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons
for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or
delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a
motion. Having established a record based on such relevant considerations, the
court should then exercise its discretion and rule on the defendant's request.

Windham, 560 P.2d at 1191-1 192; see also Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (C.A.N.Y.
1976). This list is nonexclusive, and the relevant factors may vary from case to case. State v.

Bean, 762 A.2d 1259 (Vt. 2000); see also Brown, 676 A.2d at 525 (instructing courts to consider
the merit of the reason for discharge, quality of counsel's representation prior to the request, any
disruptive effect discharge would have on the proceedings, timing of the request, the complexity
and stage of the proceedings, and any prior requests by the defendant to discharge counsel).
In Mr. Pina's case, when trial counsel asked whether the district court would still be
conducting the Favelta hearing, the court stated, "I don't think I have to have him here or go
through a Faretta inquiry, because its irrelevant to me; it's untimely. So we are proceeding with
that ruling." (Tr., p.1621, L.21 - p.1622, L.5.) The district court essentially found that the merit
of the reason for discharge, the quality of counsel's representation prior to the request, any tack
of disruptive effect discharge would have on the proceedings, and the complexity and stage of
the proceedings were "irrelevant."

Instead, the court merely considered the timing of the

request. Mr. Pina asserts that this was an abuse of discretion. The district court failed to act
within the boundaries of its discretion when it failed to make the relevant inquires, and failed to

reach its decision through an exercise of reason when it determined that the relevant inquiries
were "irrelevant."
Similarly, in Brown, supra, the trial court failed to inquire as to why the defendant was
seeking to discharge counsel. The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded:
The onus, however, is not on Respondent to interrupt a discussion between the
court and his attorney to offer an explanation, but rather the responsibility is on
the trial judge to ensure that the reason for requesting dismissal of counsel is
explained. See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44,
47-48 (1970). ...the judge must at least consider the defendant's reason for
requesting dismissal before rendering a decision. We conclude that the trial judge
abused his discretion by failing to consider the defendant's reason for seeking to
dismiss counsel.

Brown, 676 A.2d at 526 (footnote omitted).
Like the trial court in Brown, when the district court in this case failed to conduct any
inquiry whatsoever as to why, in the middle of the day, in the middle of the trial, and
immediately before he was to testify, Mr. Pina wished to discharge counsel and proceed pro se,
or to consider any of the relevant factors, the court abused its discretion
In addition, the trial court's error in this case is reversible. As a result of the district
court's abuse of discretion, the court arbitrarily denied Mr. Pina his constitutional right to
proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Further, as a result of the
district court's arbitrary act of foisting upon Mr. Pina unwanted counsel, Mr. Pina felt compelled
to remove himself from the proceedings, and did not testify in his own behalf as he had clearly
and expressly intended to do. Thus, the district court's error was reversible.

CONCLUSION
Because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, Mr. Pina respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his conviction and dismiss this case. In the alternative, Mr. Pina
asla that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
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